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Prior to noncooperative choices of abatement of a transboundary pollutant, a
technologically advanced country considers making an unconditional transfer
of abatement technology to its less-advanced rival. Even though technological
aid is given unconditionally and abatement strategies are chosen noncooperatively, in a number of plausible circumstances, a transfer of a superior control
technology will induce Pareto-superior pollution abatement.
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1 Introduction

Many believe that the transfer of "clean technologies" to less-advanced
countries will be an effective, even necessary, policy prescription to
confront international environmental problems (French, 1992; Heaton
et al., 1991; Levy et al., 1993; Pearce, 1991; von Moltke, 1992).1 Guaranteeing easy access to new technologies is often justified as a costeffective way to reduce international emissions of some pollutants. For
example, concerning the policy debate about confronting global climate change, there appears to be significant potential for improving the

efficiency of energy use in the developing world. Transferring energyefficient technologies to less-advanced countries may be a relatively
inexpensive way to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases (De
Canio and Lee, 1991; Coppel, 1994). Facilitating the transfer of clean
technologies has also been made a concrete part of a number of interna1 "Clean technologies" genetically refer to a wide range of devices, management techniques, and materials that are used to control emissions or produce

goods and services with lower environmental impacts.

2

J.

K.

Stranlund

tional environmental agreeme
vention on Hazardous Wastes"
assistance to less-developed pa
ments to the Montreal Protoc
Layer," industrialized parties t
technologies (substitutes for c
to developing countries on "fa
1991; Parsons, 1993).
Despite the consensus that te
effective

policy

instrument

in

i

economic and game-theoretic l
conflict resolution lacks a rigo
tial.2 Hence, in this paper we
technological aid to its strateg
abatement of a transboundary
We will restrict our attention to situations in which the countries do

not expect to come to a binding agreement to control emissions of the
pollutant, so the game is completely noncooperative. Furthermore, as
is often assumed in the literature on international environmental problems, reducing emissions of the transboundary pollutant is modeled
as a contribution to a pure public good (international environmental
quality).3 We shall consider a two-stage game. In the first stage of
the game, the technologically advanced country may make an unconditional gift of a superior abatement technology to the other country.
In the second stage, the countries noncooperatively choose their abatement strategies.4 In this context, we will find that a number of plausible
2 Some examples of theoretical analyses of international environmental
conflict and resolution include Barrett (1994), Black et al. (1993), Carraro and
Siniscalco (1993), Hoel (1991), Mäler (1991), Sandler and Sargent (1995), and
Welsch (1993). None of these papers consider the role of technology transfer.
3 The theory of private contributions to public goods is relevant here.
A typical list of citations will include Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Cornes
and Sandler (1986) among many others. Recent contributions include Varían

(1994), Konrad (1994), and Buchholz and Konrad (1995). The assumption

that abatement is a contribution to a pure public good is appropriate when
considering problems like ozone depletion and global climate change which
are generated by uniformly mixed pollutants. Hoel (1991), Welsch (1993),
and Buchholz and Konrad (1994) assume a uniformly mixed pollutant. If the
pollutant is not uniformly mixed the damage inflicted on a particular country

depends on the source of emissions. For examples, see Maler (1991) who

models European acid rain and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993).
4 As a model of a prior strategic investment to affect the outcome or a
future noncooperative game, the paper is related to the industrial-organization
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circumstances exist under which the advanced country will be able to
use technological aid to its strategic advantage. Furthermore, when the
advanced country transfers technology to the other, it induces Paretosuperior abatement choices. Thus, the results of this paper lend some
theoretical support to the widespread belief that transferring superior
abatement technologies can be an effective policy instrument in international environmental relations. However, because we also find that
there are equally plausible situations in which a Pareto-superior outcome cannot be induced, policy recommendations about technological
aid in a noncooperative setting should be considered cautiously.5
As a model of actions taken about abatement technology prior to
abatement choices, this paper is closely related to a recent paper by
Buchholz and Konrad (1994), in which they consider each country's
adoption decision prior to abatement choices. They find that countries
face a rather perverse incentive to adopt inferior technologies (in the
sense that they involve higher unit abatement costs than other available
technologies) so that they can precommit themselves to lower abatement in the future.6 This paper differs from theirs because they do
not consider technology transfer and we will not consider individual
commitments to an abatement technology. Interestingly, the strategic
aspects of the two approaches are quite similar. A technologically-advanced country has the incentive to transfer a superior technology for
the same reason a country is motivated to choose an inferior technology

for itself; both actions tend to shift the burden of reducing emissions
onto others. However, as we shall find, the welfare and environmental
consequences of the two types of actions are very different.
A relatively general version of the game is described in Sect. 2.
This section provides a number of interesting results about the effects
of transferring a superior technology on second-stage abatement choices
literature on strategic investments to forestall entry or expansion of a rival
firm. (Typical references include Dixit, 1981, Fudenberg and Tiróle, 1984,
and Gilbert, 1989, among many others.)
5 Since this paper assumes that the advanced country is restricted to giving
its rival a superior abatement technology, it does not consider the possibility of
mutually advantageous trades in which the less-advanced country purchases a
superior abatement technology. Allowing such trades should result in a larger
set of Pareto-improving transfers.
6 They also find that a nation is motivated to adopt inferior abatement
technologies prior to a cooperative agreement because doing so will improve
its bargaining position. In a related paper, Copeland (1990) finds that, in the
absence of international cooperation, countries may have a strategic incentive to degrade common property resources to influence the behavior of rival

nations.
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2 The Game

The players of the game are two countries, which we shall call the North

and the South. (Imagine benevolent governments acting on behalf of
their citizens.) Suppose throughout that the North possesses superior
abatement technologies. In the first stage of the game, it may give a
superior abatement technology to the South to influence the outcome
of the second-stage abatement game. The transfer of a superior technology is completely unconditional - the South does not pay a price
for a superior technology, nor is it obligated to a particular abatement
choice in the second stage of the game. A subgame-perfect equilibrium
of this game consists of a technology transfer in the first stage, and
noncooperative abatement choices in the second stage, conditional on
the first-stage transfer.

2.1 Technology Transfer
Let the total cost of *n units of abatement by the North be the monotonically increasing and strictly convex function cn(*n)- The South's
abatement cost function is assumed to be cs(*s, 0 which is increasing
at an increasing rate in its abatement xs- The variable t is taken from a
continuous, nonnegative index of technologies defined on the closed interval [0, /°]. The index orders the technologies according to their effec-

tiveness in reducing the South's abatement cost so that cs(xs, t ) is decreasing in t. We will also assume that the South's marginal abatement

cost is decreasing in t. Therefore, dcs/dt < 0 and d2cs/dxsdt < 0.
We will say that ť is superior to (or more effective than) t" if ť > t".
Let t = 0 denote the technology that the South possesses at the
beginning of the game, and let t° denote the best technology that the
North possesses. In addition, the North possesses, or can develop at
some cost, technologies that are inferior to t°, but superior to technology 0. The open interval (0, t° ) contains these technologies, each of
which the North may choose to give to the South.
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2.2 Second-stage Abatement
The welfare of country i is given by a utility function u¡ (jcn + Jts, y¡),

which we shall assume is increasing at a decreasing rate in total abatement and increasing at a nonincreasing rate in private consumption.
We shall also assume that consumption of environmental quality and
the private good are weakly complementary. That is, d2u¡/dXdy¡ > 0,
where X = jcn + *s. These assumptions along with those concerning
abatement costs are sufficient to guarantee the results of this section.7
Let the price of private consumption be unity and let country V s
exogenously given national income be m(. Thus, the North's budget
constraint is win = w + cn(jcn) and the South's is ms = ys + cs(*s> t).
A subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game requires that second-stage
abatement choices form a Nash noncooperative equilibrium that is conditional on the first-stage technology transfer. Given a technology that
the South actually implements, a second-stage equilibrium is a pair of

abatement choices which solve the following optimiza-

tion problems simultaneously:

max«N(xN + *s, wN - cn(*N)) ,
JCN

max wsUn + ^s^s- csUs, t )) .

(1)

To analyze how the first-stage technology transfer affects secondstage abatement choices, let us consider the Nash best-response functions of the countries and focus on unique, interior second-stage equilibria. For the North the best-response function is jcn = 0 nUs) which
is implicitly defined by the first-order condition 9mn/9*n = du^/dX

- (dux/dyn)cfN = 0. The best-response function of the South is xs

= 0s C*N» t) which is implicitly defined by dus/dxs = dus/dX - ( dus /
dys)(dcs/dxs) = 0.8 The best-response functions have the following

characteristics:

d<M*s) w t m 90s Un, 0 _ , , m ^ 90s Un, 0 n
-

axs

ox

N

ot

(2)
7 With d2Ui/dXdyi > 0, it can be shown that environmental quality and
private consumption are strictly normal goods. That is, holding abatement of
the other nation constant, an increase in income will be allocated to increased
abatement and increased consumption of the private good.
8 Of course, the best-response functions also depend on income levels,
but these are ignored because they are not needed for our purposes.
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Lastly, one can use (3) and (4) to obtain the marginal re
between total abatement and the first-stage transfer:

+x¡(t)] _ 30s f. d0Nir d^S^s]-1 0

d t _ 3 1 L djcs J L djcs 3JCNJ

Taken together, (3), (4), and (5) give us the equilibriu

quences of transferring a more effective abatement technol
a superior technology lowers the abatement cost (total and
of the South, it is willing to take on a larger abatement bu

response, the North reduces its abatement, but the overall effec

total abatement increases. (The effects of transferring a mor

technology ť > t are illustrated in Fig. 1.) These are essen

strategic aspects of technological aid when two governments
lateral pollution problem in a noncooperative fashion. By inv
the abatement capability of another, a technologically advanc
can shift a portion of the burden of controlling emissions a
itself. Furthermore, such an investment leads to better envi
quality in both nations.9

9 Note that these results do not depend on the relative prefer
environmental quality in the North and South, nor do they depen
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Fig. 1 : The effects of transferring a more effective abatement technology on
equilibrium abatement choices in the second stage

It is instructive to compare these results to those of Buchholz and
Konrad (1994). They found that countries are motivated to adopt inferior abatement technologies to shift the burden of providing pollution control onto others. Adoption of a technology with higher unit
abatement cost precommits a country to lower abatement in the future. (They assume constant marginal abatement costs.) In equilibrium,
others respond with higher abatement. The essential aspect that drives
the burden-shift is that the relative unit-abatement costs change. Adop-

tion of an inferior technology implies that others have relatively lower
unit-control costs, and hence, in equilibrium, they end up taking on a
relatively larger abatement burden. A similar thing happens when one
country provides another with a superior abatement technology; the
donor nation's marginal control costs increase relative to the other's.
In equilibrium, this induces a shift of the abatement burden onto the
less-advanced nation. Though the burden-shifting characteristic of the
two actions are the same, the environmental and welfare consequences
are very different. Buchholz and Konrad find that environmental quality is unambiguously worse when nations strategically adopt inferior
relative control costs. In particular, the results do not require the North to have
stronger demand for environmental quality or lower abatement costs. However,
whether or not the focus on interior choices is justified will depend on relative

preferences and costs. For example, if the North has significantly stronger
preferences for environmental quality and significantly lower control costs,
its choice of abatement may completely "crowd out" the South' s incentive to

control its own emissions.
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In another related paper, Maijit (1990) finds conditions under which
a technologically advanced firm can sell a superior production technology to its less-advanced Cournot rival. With linear demand and constant
marginal production costs, it is straightforward to show that the strate-

gic effects of a technology transfer are similar to those in the publicgoods context; namely, output of the advanced firm decreases, output
of its rival increases, and total industry output increases. However, in
the duopoly situation, the transfer of a superior production technology
without compensation would lead to lower profit for the advanced firm
and higher profit for the less-advanced firm. Clearly, a superior production technology will never be freely given. If a transfer is to take place
the less-advanced firm's gain in production profit must be large enough

so that it is able to compensate àie advanced firm for its loss of profit.
In contrast, in the public-goods context the welfare of the North (excluding the costs of the transfer) must increase because environmental
quality improves and it is able to reduce its emissions control. Hence,
if the transfer cost is low enough, the North will always have an incentive to transfer a superior control technology without compensation

from the South.

However, the South is not necessarily better off with a superior tech-

nology. Consider the South's equilibrium welfare u'(t) = us(x£(t) +
x£(t), m s - es (xg(t), 0). To see why the South may be worse off with
a marginally superior technology, differentiate Ug(t) and use the first-

order condition dus/dxs = dus/dX - (dus/dys)(dcs/dxs) = 0 to
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obtain

d u$(t) _ dus 3ms 3^s
d¿ dX d t dys dt

Note that du^(t)/dt has the same sign as

dus/dX dx * des
3ws/3;ys dř 3í
Equation (6) shows that the South experiences a cost and a benefit
from the transfer and adoption of a superior control technology. Recall
that the transfer of a superior technology allows the North to reduce
its emissions control. The first term in Eq. (6) is the value that the

South places on the North's reduced emissions control. The second

term is the reduction in the South' s abatement costs due to adoption
of the superior technology at its equilibrium abatement choice. Thus,
if adopting a superior technology induces a relatively small reduction
in the South' s abatement costs, but a relatively large reduction in the
North's equilibrium abatement which the South places a high value on,
it may be worse off with a superior technology.
We shall give the South the ability to refuse a superior technology
if its welfare is not improved. Let us assume for simplicity that if the

South is offered a superior technology t > 0, it either adopts t or

stays with its own technology 0. This assumption implies that receipt
of some technology t does not make other technologies available to the
South that are inferior to t , but superior to technology 0. Given some
transfer f , denote the adoption strategy of the South as i (t) and note that

i(t ) = '

i0 if uUt) < «*(0),

[t if U*s(t) > W*(0).

Clearly, this strategy does not involve any noncredible threats. Therefore, the North must account for this adoption strategy when it chooses
a technology to transfer.

2.3 First-stage Technology Transfer
The North chooses a technology transfer in the first stage of the game
by looking forward to the second-stage outcome. Transferring a technology has a cost which may include the costs of providing technical
assistance for the installation and maintenance of a new abatement

technology; expenditures to find and develop new technologies, or to
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A first-stage transfer t* that is a solution to (7) and the second-stage
abatement pair [jcj^(r*), jc|(/*)] form a subgame-perfect equilibrium for
the entire game.

Note that if the solution to (7) is such that t* > 0, it must be a
Pareto-improvement on the no-transfer case. Clearly, if t* > 0 is a
solution to (6), the North must be better off than in the no-transfer
case. Also, since a solution t* > 0 must satisfy the South's adoption
requirement, it must also be better off than in the no-transfer case.

We conclude: If the North finds it optimal to transfer a superior
technology to the South, doing so will induce Pareto-superior pollution
control.10

Observe that this result is due to the structure of the game, not to
any particular assumption about preferences or abatement costs.

3 Subgame-perfect Technological Aid: an Example
Unfortunately, at the level of generality assumed in the last section, a
fuller characterization of possible subgame-perfect transfers is not pos-

sible. In this section we shall examine an example in which quadratic
forms with nice curvature properties are adopted to uniquely identify
equilibrium transfers. The example is used to illustrate an aspect of
10 Of course, because abatement strategies are chosen noncooperatively,
the transfer of a superior technology cannot induce fully efficient pollution

control.

optim

ffiN

(7)

-
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technological aid that may be a significant consideration for policymakers in advanced countries. Namely, even though the utility and
cost functions may be simple and well-behaved, the objective function
for the North in the first stage of the game can easily be quite complex

with boundary maxima and/or multiple local maxima. Thus, to actually
identify a globally optimal transfer, policymakers in advanced countries
may face the difficult task of estimating transfer costs and the benefits

of pollution control; including, of course, the strategic interdependence
of control policies, over the entire range of possible transfers.11
Assume that the utility functions are the following:

Mn(*N, Jn) = ßti(XN + *s) - ¿(*N + *s)2 + W ,
and

*7

Ws
where

Un,

ß^,

ßs

ys)
,

2

=

and

ßs

r]

Un

are

+

*s

positive

tions are quasi-linear and strict
likely that the country with su
has a stronger preference for e
sumes that the North's demand
strong as the South' s. To capt
and r¡ > 1. Under these assump
of total abatement does not lie
as steep.

Suppose that the North's aba
and let the South's abatementX |, where a > 1 and ix is a posi
(a-nt) is the closed interval [1,

Note

that

if

the

abatement-cost

North

functions

tran
of

wise the South's abatement cost lies above the North's.

Let us assume throughout that national incomes are sufficient to
guarantee that the game admits equilibria in which private consumption by both countries is strictly positive. This assumption and quasilinearity of the utility functions lets us ignore national incomes since
they will have no bearing on optimal choices. Then, the counterparts
1 1 This problem is related to the well-known policy problem of nonconvexities that arise in externality-control problems. See Baumol and Oates
(1988) for an introduction, and Helfand and Rubin (1994) for a recent contri-

bution.
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of the optimization problems given

max wn(*n, *s) = £n(*n + *

*N

and

(8)
rj

2

a

~~

2

max us(x N, *s) = #s(*n + xs) - -(*n + *s) 2

xs

2

2

Note

tha

Given

som

suming

choices are

x. = ft.fr, + («-»»)) -ft md x.(l) = 2ft - """ . .2
r} + 2(a - nt) + 2(a - nt)

(9)
(All the derivations of this section are given in Appendix 2.) We will
focus on interior equilibrium abatement, which is guaranteed for all t
e [0, ( a - 1 ) / 7T ] if and only if (2/t])ßs > ßn > (l/2)>8sThe payoff function for the South given some technology that it
adopts is

«s(0 = &[*N(0 +*!(')] - |[*N(0 +*S*(')]2 - . (10)
It is shown in Appendix 2 that u$(t) is strictly increasing in more effective technologies. Thus, for this example, if the South' s equilibrium
abatement choice is expected to be positive, it will adopt any superior
abatement technology that the North chooses to transfer.13

To this point we have a very well-behaved system. The second-stage
equilibrium choices of pollution control are unique, and, assuming as
we do that they are interior choices, the South will adopt any superior
12 Note that the North's equilibrium abatement is decreasing in t, while
the South' s equilibrium abatement is increasing in t. Furthermore, it is easy
to show that total abatement is increasing in t. These confirm our results
from Sect. 2 that transferring a superior technology in the first stage allows
the North to shift a portion of the burden of abatement onto the South and
induces greater total abatement.
13 Even though the South' s adoption strategy does not bind the North s
choice of aid in this example, recall that this result cannot be generated in
more general versions of the game.

a
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technology the North chooses to transfer. The only thing left is for the

North to choose a transfer t e [0, ř°] that maximizes u^(t) - w(t),

where

= MxUO + *s(0] - ¿[*n(0 + *s(012 - ^n(02 • (1 D
As expected, «^(i) *s strictly increasing in more effective technologies. However, assuming as we have been that the North's demand for
environmental quality is at least as strong as the South's, u^(t) and

d«j^(ř)/dř are both strictly convex for all t e [0, ( a - 1)/jt]. (This

result is also derived in Appendix 2.) Then, since w{t) is convex (perhaps weakly), the North's objective in the first stage of the game, wj^(i)
- w(t), will likely lack the concavity property necessary for easy identification of an optimal transfer.14
Now, let us identify the possible subgame-perfect transfers for this
example. To simplify matters, let us assume that the cost of transferring

superior control technologies w(t) is increasing at a linearly increasing
rate, and that there are no fixed costs associated with transferring tech-

nology. (Of course, the presence of fixed costs can be another source of
multiple local maxima.) Then, there are five cases to consider. The first
three are illustrated in Fig. 2, which assumes that d«j^(0)/d/ > u>'( 0).
In case A, the marginal transfer cost function w'A(t ) cuts d«£,(í)/dí
once from below. In this case, the subgame-perfect transfer is r3, a rel-

atively modest investment in the South's abatement technology. In case
B, the marginal transfer cost function w'B(t) cuts d«^(ř)/dř twice, once
from below and once from above. In this case, there are two locally
optimal transfers, t 2 and t°. (Note that i1 identifies a local minimum.)
In case C, the marginal transfer cost function w'c(t) lies everywhere
below dM^(ř)/dř, so the subgame-perfect transfer is the best abatement
technology t°.
Cases B and C illustrate two important considerations for policymakers in the North. First, because of the strict convexity of u^(t), there

are plausible circumstances under which it is optimal for the North to
provide its best control technology so that the countries' abatement capabilities are equalized. Second, case B illustrates the possibility of two
locally optimal transfers, one of which is the transfer of the best tech-

nology. The presence of multiple local maxima is problematic because
if the North considers only incremental investments from the status quo
14 This is true even though the underlying utility and abatement-cost
functions are quite simple. With more complicated utility and cost functions,
we should expect that the North's first-stage objective will be even more
complex.
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Fig. 2: Possible subgame perfect tran
environmental quality is at least as s

u/(0)

(t = 0), a simple "marginal benefit equal to marginal cost" rule will
lead it to settle on a moderate transfer like t2 when a more radical
investment like transferring its best technology may be the global optimum. The fact that the optimal transfer may be die best technology
and the possibility of multiple local optima seem to imply that policymakers in the North need to be able to estimate the net benefits of
pollution control and transfer costs over the entire range of potential
transfers. Clearly, this will be a difficult task.

The two remaining cases are illustrated in Fig. 3, which assumes
dnj,(0)/df < u/(0).15 In case D, the marginal transfer cost function
w'D(t) lies everywhere above du^CO/df. Here, any improvement in the
South's abatement technology is too costly, so in the subgame-perfect
equilibrium, no transfer takes place. In case E, the marginal transfer cost
function w'E(t) cuts du£,(f)/d/ once from above, so the subgame-perfect

equilibrium consists of the transfer of the best abatement technology
or nothing at all. Case E is interesting because modest transfers are too
costly, but equalizing the abatement capabilities of the two nations may
be a Pareto-improvement. Again, a search only over incremental improvements in die South's abatement capability may lead policymakers
15 These cases also apply when diij,(0)/d/ = w'(0).
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Fig. 3: Possible subgame perfect transfers when the North's preference for
environmental quality is at least as strong as the South's, and d«^(0)/d/ <

u/(0)

in the North to discard technological aid as too expensive, when in
fact the truly optimal policy is to make its best abatement technology
available to the South.16

4 Concluding Remarks
By examining some of the circumstances under which an advanced
nation can use technological aid to its strategic advantage, we have
generated results that lend some theoretical support to policy recommendations about the transfer of superior pollution-control technologies

to less-advanced nations. When a cooperative agreement to control a
transboundary pollutant is prohibitively difficult, investing in the abate-

ment capability of another affects future interaction in ways that are
favorable to the donor nation; namely, the investment shifts a portion of

the burden of noncooperative pollution control away from itself. With

a similar model, Buchholz and Konrad (1994) found that countries

may be motivated to adopt inferior abatement technologies for them16 The problem of multiple local optima disappears with constant marginal transfer costs, but in this case either no transfer is optimal or the transfer

of the best technology is optimal.
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of the potential donor nations is
gives a superior technology to a l
has an incentive to freeride on the
Furthermore, because of the freer
incentive

to

cooperate

in

the

transfe

It seems likely that the incentive
important policy considerations in
This work should also be extende
tial of technological aid when par
agreement to limit emissions of a
whether an advanced country can
favorable negotiating position or
international environmental agree
the strategic use of technological a
eventual

agreement,

paying

particiila

ronmental consequences. Furtherm
environmental agreements includ
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transfer, researchers should begin to think seriously about how these
mechanisms ought to be designed. These issues (and probably others)
should be pursued in future work to provide policymakers with a more
complete characterization of the potential of technological aid in inter-

national environmental relations.

Appendix 1
Our purpose is to show the following:

à<t>N(xs) ^ 90s(*n, 0 , , m and . 90sC*n, t)
-

curs

9*n

Consider

c$

(.v's

,

ot

the

/)),

dus
dxs SX dys dxs

_

Sout

and

the

dus

_

where X = xn + xs- This first-order condition implicitly defines t
best-response function *s = 4>s(*n, t). Then,

d<t>s _ dzu s/dxNdxs

3*n d2us/dx'

Now,

32«s _ /d2us d2us 3cs' / d2us 3cs'
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_ /32cs 3MS '
^ dxg dys /
The assumptions we made in the text about the utility and abatement-
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cost functions include
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dXdys ava dxs dx£ T

Using (Al) we have

-
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-

-
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<

which
are
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0,
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<
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sufficient
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>

dxsdxtf

d<ps/dxu
to

d^/dxs

90s
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dxg
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obtain

€

e

(-1,0

this

(-1,0)

is

res

eas

d2us/dxsdt

dt d2us/dx$
where

92"S _ / 32«s 9cs' /d2us des dcs' / d2cs 9«s'
dxs dt 'dXdys dt / V 3_y| dxs dt / 'dxsdt 9ys'
In addition to the assumptions listed in (Al), we also have dcs/dt < 0
and d2cs/dxsdt < 0. Then, d2us/dxsdt > 0 which with 32ms/9jc| < 0
implies 3</>s/9ř > 0.

Appendix 2
Given some transfer from the first-stage that the South adopts, and
assuming an interior second-stage equilibrium, the first-order conditions

to the optimization problems given by (8) in the text are

ßN - *N -xs -*N = 0 (A2.1)
and

ßs - rç(*N + xs) - (a- nt)xs = 0 . (A2.2)
Solving the first-order conditions yields the equilibrium abatement
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choices given by (9) in the text:
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The marginal effects on abatement of the technology transferred i
first stage of the game are
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the first-order condition (A2.1
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20

J.

K.

The

Stranlund

inequality

that

«Jf(0

and

d2«*(r)

follows

d«^(ř)/dí

d

because

are

2x¡it)

both

,

d*Ã

~ď^-~ďP~XN{t)

Use

(A2.3),

(A2.4),

d2«J,(/)

1¡¡-

The

=

first

ity

of

That

is,

that

the

+

in

2ßu(a
t

and

2n2(2ßs

t„

term

«n(0

and

+

on

(A2.5)

-

t

nt)
is

of

the

right-hand

on

the
=

most

Now,
(a

-

1

si

sign
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sign
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rifa)
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Git) > {4 fait, + 1) + fan - 6ßs] , (A2.9)
and

Hit) > {2ßN it] + D + fav - 4ßs) , (A2.10)
for all t € [0, ia - ')/n]. Assuming as we do that the North's demand
for environmental quality is at least as strong as the South' s, so that

ßii > ßs and r, > 1, the right-hand sides of (A2.9) and (A2.10) are

strictly positive, and hence, Git) and Hit) are both strictly positive for
all t e [0, ia- 1)/tt]. Thus, when the North's demand for environmental
quality is at least as strong as the South's, wjÜ,(f) and d«^,(/)/d/ are both
strictly convex.
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